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## THE ROOTS OF CORRUPTION: THE GHANAIAN ENQUIRY REVISITED<sup>1</sup>

By

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### Summary

*Corruption has engaged the attention of the international community, politicians and citizens because of its deleterious and corrosive consequences on politics, governance, security and socio-economic development. Several strategies including reform of the constitutional, legal and institutional framework have been implemented by all countries including Ghana to curb the scourge of corruption but they have remained largely unsuccessful. As a contribution to the debate over corruption, this paper revisits some of the causes of corruption especially social norms or socio-cultural practices and values in Ghana using data obtained from the Corruption Survey, which was undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana in 2015. After a review of the literature on corruption, the paper discusses the findings of The IEA Corruption Survey in the following three areas: (i) motives and causes of corruption; (ii) evidence and perception of extent of corruption; and (iii) combating corruption. The paper found that traditional and cultural values and practices may not necessarily be the major cause of corruption in Ghana. Traditional practices in themselves do not support corruption; it is rather individuals who misinterpret some of these practices for their own selfish needs or ends. On the contrary, corruption is the result of a combination of factors. Some of the policy recommendations include a bipartisan approach to fighting corruption; improvement in the overall governance situation; development of a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability; use of some traditional values and practices; viewing the fight against corruption from a long term perspective; transformational leadership; training and education on ethics and ethical behaviour; use of smart technology and e-governance; and additional pressure from civil society and development partners on the government.*



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## Introduction

Several papers have been published on corruption because of its deleterious and corrosive effects on politics, governance, security and socio-economic development. Corruption is commonly perceived to be a major stumbling block on the road to prosperity. Aside from retarding growth (Mauro 1995), corruption entails fiscal leakage, which reduces the ability of developing countries to supply essential public services such as schooling and health care (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; World Bank 2004). Corruption can undermine the state's ability to deliver inclusive economic growth in a number of different areas. When government functions are impaired, it can adversely affect a number of important determinants of economic performance, including macro financial stability, investment, human capital accumulation, and total factor productivity. Moreover, when systemic corruption affects virtually all state functions, distrust of government can become so pervasive that it can lead to violence, civil strife, and conflict, with devastating social and economic implications (IMF 2016; UNECA 2011).

Corruption is unquestionably a governance failure one would like to dispose of, yet combating it has not proven easy (Andersen et.al. 2011). Fighting corruption has therefore become increasingly urgent. This sense of urgency arises in an environment where growth and employment prospects in many countries remain subdued and a number of high profile corruption cases have fueled moral outrage. It also arises because there is a growing consensus that corruption is macro-critical, as it can seriously undermine inclusive economic growth.

The urgency is global in nature since corruption is a problem that affects both developed and developing countries (IMF 2016). It is no wonder an international summit was held in May 2016 by the British Prime Minister in London which was attended by leaders of 40 countries including Ghana. The participating countries which attended the summit agreed to take four specific pro-transparency measures to fight corruption, namely, gather more information on the true beneficial owners of companies; increase transparency in public contracting; increase budget transparency through the strengthening of genuinely independent supreme audit institutions; and strengthen protections for whistleblowers<sup>3</sup>. In the last week of June 2016, the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), the local Chapter of Transparency International (TI) also held its maiden National Anti-Corruption Forum on the theme “Consolidating Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Efforts: Building Consensus to Address Existing Gaps”. The Forum brought together key stakeholders to evaluate Ghana’s efforts in the fight against corruption and also strategize to address any identified challenges that hinder progress.

Against this backdrop, this paper revisits some of the causes of corruption especially social norms or social and cultural practices and values in Ghana based on data obtained from the Corruption Survey undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana in 2015. The paper answers the following two questions: (i) Is there a link or connection between social norms that tolerate corruption (“corruption norms”) and the prevalence of corruption in Ghana? and (ii) Is there any evidence to suggest that there are corruption norms as a result of society and culture in Ghana?

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<sup>1</sup>The title of the paper was influenced by H.H. Werlin, “The Roots of Corruption-The Ghanaian Enquiry” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (2) (July 1972): 247-266

<sup>3</sup> See “Anti-Corruption Summit: London 2016 - GOV.UK” May 31, 2016 accessed at <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016>

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In doing so, the paper therefore contributes to the debate over the causes of corruption in Ghana.

The paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with the methodology. Part 2 is devoted to a review of the state-of-the-art on corruption. Part 3 discusses the findings of the Corruption Survey undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs in 2015. The discussion focuses on the following issues about corruption: (i) motives for and causes of corruption; (ii) evidence and perception of extent of corruption; and (iii) combating corruption. Part 4 is devoted to summarizing the findings and highlighting some key policy recommendations.

## **Methodology**

A combination of primary source and desk study (literature review) was used. The primary source is derived from data analyzed from the Institute of Economic Affairs' (IEA) Corruption Survey of Ghana, which dealt with public perception and assessment of corruption situation and undertaken in November/December 2015. The Corruption Survey focused mainly on five issues including (i) understanding of and awareness about corruption; (ii) opportunities for corruption; (iii) motives and causes of corruption; (iv) evidence and perception of extent of corruption; and (v) combating corruption.

The Corruption Survey used a probability sample design where each person aged 18 years and above in Ghana has a known non-zero chance of being included in the sample. A regionally disaggregated representative sample of 1,500 respondents aged 18 years and above from the 10 regions of Ghana was selected. Some quality control measures such

as the use of probability sampling and use of structured questionnaire were put in place to strengthen the methodology (Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana 2016).

## **Corruption: A Brief State-of-the-Art**

The literature on corruption is burgeoning and extant (UNDP 2008; Hope 2015; World Bank 2015, among others). The publications are in the form of books, journal articles, instruments and conventions and devoted to the definitions, forms, types, causes, determinants, consequences and measurement of corruption (IMF 2016; UNECA 2011, Soreide and Williams 2014, among others). Other publications have also covered the strategies to combat corruption and their efficacy as well as country and sector specific case studies (Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011; Soreide 2014; Hope 2016, among others). Space will not, however, allow us to go into the details of the state-of-the-art on corruption. This notwithstanding, it is important to note that corruption in Ghana is the result of a combination of factors and not necessarily limited to traditional and cultural values. They include monetization of politics leading to vote-buying, greed, avarice, patronage, weaknesses in institutional structures leading to the failure to implement and enforce policies and laws to promote transparency and accountability, low remuneration, poor management practices in public organizations, immense opportunities for corruption with minimal chances for being caught and punished, low levels of integrity, discretion of public officials and absence of good record keeping. In addition, the literature shows sensitivity to the political economy of corruption, that is, the actors, their motives, interests, incentives and benefits derived from engaging in corrupt practices.

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Although corruption has been defined in many different ways, there is no generally accepted definition that applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption. This notwithstanding, we may define corruption in this paper as the abuse of public or private office for personal gain or how individuals entrusted with authority to make decisions on behalf of the organization misuse their position for personal gain (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; DfID 2013; Soreide 2014). In other words, corruption comprises the misuse of entrusted power or responsibility for any private benefit of self or others (Heywood 1997; Hope 2000). This definition is consistent with that of most international processes and conventions as well as Ghana's National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP), 2015-2024.

### **Findings from the 2015 Institute of Economic Affairs Corruption Survey**

This section discusses data of the IEA 2015 Corruption Survey in three areas: (i) motives for and causes of corruption; (ii) evidence/perception of extent of corruption; and (iii) combating corruption.

### ***Motives for and Causes of Corruption***

Exploring the motives behind and the causes of corruption gives us a more nuanced and better understanding of the prevalence of corruption and possibly how to curb it. Table 1.1 contains the responses on the motives for corruption. "Avoiding punishment/sanctions" constitutes the highest motive behind corrupt practices (23.7%). This is followed by "avoiding higher official payments" (20.8%), "to be treated (served) appropriately" (19.3%); and "the practice of obligatory (illegal) payments to supervisors" (12.2%). Taken together, these four responses seem to reinforce a number of issues about Ghanaian society. First, Ghanaian society generally does not want to apply sanctions. Where punishment and sanctions are applied at all, they are selective. Second, there is a patronage system where informal practices supplant formal structures. Personal ties more than formal rules more often than not drive public administration and political competition. The result is the creation of an environment characterized by inadequate commitment to tackle the underlying causes of corruption. Third, status and privileges are part of Ghanaian society, which most people, particularly those who are benefitting from the status quo, are not prepared to give up freely.

**Table 1.1: Main Motives Behind Corrupt Practices**

	In your opinion, which of the following are the main motives behind corrupt practices?	Frequency	Percent
a.	There is no other way to get things done	23	1.6
b.	To avoid punishment/sanctions	343	23.7
c.	To avoid higher official payments	302	20.8
d.	To speed up the processes/procedures	100	6.9
e.	To be treated (served) appropriately	279	19.3
f.	To get preferential treatment/privileges	71	4.9
g.	To have alternative source of income	94	6.5
h.	The practice of obligatory (illegal) “payments” to supervisors	177	12.2
i.	Other	38	2.6
j.	Don’t know	19	1.3
k.	Refused to answer	3	0.2
<b>Total</b>		<b>1449</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Table 1.2 has responses on factors causing corruption. Taking the average of the three responses when respondents were asked to list the factors causing corruption in Ghana, “get rich quick” (23.9%) is the leading cause of corruption in Ghana. This is followed by “greed and selfishness” (21.9%;) and “low salaries” (20.4%). For the first rating, “greed and selfishness” were cited as the leading causes of corruption in Ghana, 27.9% of the respondents surveyed. This is followed by “get rich quick” (24%) and “low salaries” (23.4). In the second rating, “get rich quick”

(23.2%) was the leading cause followed by “greed and selfishness” (21.1%) and “low salaries” (19.1%). The third rating still ranks “get rich quick” as the most important factor (24.6%) followed by “low salaries” (18.6%) and “greed and selfishness” (16.8%). This means that 45% of respondents believe that “get rich quick” and “greed and selfishness” which may be regarded as two sides of the same coin are the leading causes of corruption in Ghana. This also shows how materialistic Ghanaian society has become.

**Table 1.2: Factors Causing Corruption in Ghana**

No.	What do you think are the factors causing corruption in Ghana	First	Second	Third
1.	Low salaries	23.4	19.1	18.6
2.	Lack of ethics	5.9	12.3	8.8
3.	Get rich quick	24.0	23.2	24.6
4.	Socio-cultural demands	1.6	2.2	2.5
5.	Lack of clear rules and laws	4.1	7.5	9.3
6.	Lack of punitive and deterrent sanctions	5.2	4.9	7.2
7.	Abuse or mal-use of power in the public sector	3.6	4.4	6.4
8.	Excessive bureaucracy	1.9	4.1	4.6
9.	Greed and selfishness	27.9	21.1	16.8
10.	Other	2.4	1.2	1.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Interestingly, “socio-cultural demands” (1.6%, 2.2% and 2.5%) scored an average of 2.1%, which is the least of the factors causing corruption and therefore insignificant. This is particularly interesting given that some scholars and others have largely linked corruption to socio-cultural values and demands. The level of tolerance for corruption has risen to alarming levels and it has been argued that this could stem from societal values and belief systems.

The findings here, however, do not convincingly support the point in linking corruption to traditions and customs. Traditional values and practices may therefore be seen as contributory factors to corruption but they are by no means the leading ones if compared to the figures of get “rich quick” and “greed and selfishness”.

Do traditional values influence corruption? Some traditional practices are used as cover up for corrupt activities of certain individuals. These include the giving of

gifts, which are sometimes sanctioned under traditional practices. Traditional practices in themselves do not support corruption; it is rather individuals who misinterpret some of these practices for their own selfish needs.

The “low salaries” which ranks as the third cause of corruption in Ghana equally deserves some attention. We have already pointed out that a burgeoning literature suggests that raising the salaries of government officials could reduce their propensity to solicit and accept bribes. The findings show that the implementation of the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in 2010 does not seem to increase salaries and therefore may have accounted for the 20.4% of respondents rating “low salaries” as the third cause of corruption. This assertion is incorrect as far as the evidence suggests. Since the introduction of the SSPP, between 2010 and 2014 the base-pay increased (nominally) by 71% (GHS 1108.08 in 2010 to GHS1898.55 in 2014) (Ayee 2016a).



But in real terms the base-pay increased by only 12% (using average CPI for 2010 to 2014 as basis for analysis). There were real gains between 2010 and 2012 (19%). The real gains are declining since 2012

(a decline of about 6% between 2012 and 2014) (see Tables 1.3; 1.4)<sup>4</sup>. The decline seems sharper in 2015 because of inflation and depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi.

**Table 1.3: Single Spine Salaries, 2010 - 2014**

Year	Base Pay (GHS) GHS3.4/USD	Increase (%)	CPI Average	Real Wages Index
2010	1108.08 (USD 33)	-	336.5	3.29
2011	1329.7 (USD 39)	20	365.8	3.63
2012	1569.04 (USD 46)	18	399.3	3.92
2013	1725.95 (USD 51)	10	445.9	3.87
2014	1895.55 (USD 58)	10	515.0	3.68

**Source:** Yaw Baah, Deputy Secretary General of TUC, powerpoint presentation on “Role and Expectations of the Unions in the Implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure” at a forum on SSPP in Accra, August, 2015.

**Table 1.4: Single Spine Salaries, 2015**

Type of Pay	GHS Annual GHS3.4/USD	GHS Monthly GHS3.4/USD	USD Monthly at GHS3.4/USD
Minimum Pay	2269.83 (USD 68)	189	55.58
Maximum Pay	47,180 (USD 1388)	3,932	1156

**Source:** Yaw Baah, Deputy Secretary General of TUC, powerpoint presentation on “Role and Expectations of the Unions in the Implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure” at a forum on SSPP in Accra, August, 2015.

The rate of inflation in 2012 was 8.1% rising to 13.5%, 17% and 17.5% in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively (see Table 1.5). This is the highest since August 2009, mainly due to a jump in the price of transport<sup>5</sup>. The Ghanaian currency, the cedi also depreciated by 40% against the US dollar in 2014 making it the worst performing currency in the world 2014 (Bloomberg, 2 August 2014).

It however, depreciated in 2015 with 18.75% and 15% in 2015 and 2016 respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Yaw Baah, Deputy Secretary General of the TUC, powerpoint presentation on “Role and Expectations of the Unions in the implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure” at a forum on the SSPP in Accra, August, 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Inflation in Ghana averaged 17.15% in 1998 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 63% in 2001 and record low of 0.4% in May 1999. Inflation is reported by the Ghana Statistical Service.

**Table 1.5: Turn Around Indicators of the Ghanaian Economy, 2012-2016**

Indicator	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*
<b>Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)</b>	-11.5	-10.1	-10.2	-7.0	-5.3
<b>Primary Balance (% of GDP)</b>	-8.2	-5.4	-3.9	-0.2	1.3
<b>Wage/Tax Revenue (%)</b>	55.3	57.6	49.1	44.2	40.6
<b>Current Account Balance (% of GDP)</b>	-11.7	-11.9	-9.6	-8.2	-7.2
<b>Interest Rate (91-day T-bill)</b>	23.1	19.2	25.8	22.9	-
<b>Inflation (%)</b>	8.1	13.5	17.0	17.7	10.0
<b>Real GDP Growth (%)</b>	8.0	7.3	4.0	4.1	5.4

**Source:** Republic of Ghana The Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2016 Financial year presented to Parliament on Friday, 13<sup>th</sup> September 2015.

Ghana has witnessed an increased wage bill (70% of revenues spent on wages and reduced to 57%) – a trend largely attributable to the implementation of the SSPP (IMF 2015; Ayee 2016a). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that wages and salaries, as a percentage of GDP, have doubled since 2000 and concluded that:

*... the wage bill has been a major source of expenditure pressure in Ghana. The introduction of the “Single Spine (SS)” pay structure in 2010 led to a substantial increase in employees’ compensation as almost all public servants’ salaries were increased for several years in a row, while delays in moving staff to the SS resulted in large arrears as well (International Monetary Fund 2015: 5).*

On paper, the government seemed concerned about reforming and reducing the wage bill because of its deleterious effects on the economy as indicated in the President’s 2016 State of the nation address to Parliament<sup>6</sup>.

The link between increased salaries and reduced corruption has also been disputed by Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015). According to them, the doubling of salaries of police officers in 2010 as part of the SSPP did not mitigate petty corruption on the roads. Using unique data on bribes paid from over 2,100 truck trips in West Africa and representing over 45,000 bribe opportunities, they evaluated impacts of higher police salaries on petty corruption using a difference-in-difference method that exploits the exogenous policy experiment. By following bribes paid by the same trucks in different countries as well as to different civil servants in Ghana, they identified whether salaries affect the effort to seek bribes, their value and the total amount paid by truckers. Rather than decrease petty corruption, the salary policy significantly increased the police efforts to collect bribes, the value of bribes and the amounts given by truck drivers to policemen in total. Robustness checks show the higher bribe efforts and amounts are stable across alternative specifications (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015).

<sup>6</sup> Republic of Ghana, State of the Nation Address to Parliament, by President John Mahama, accessed June 20 at [www.presidency.gov.gh](http://www.presidency.gov.gh)



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## *Evidence/Perception of the Extent of Corruption*

There is a relatively high evidence and perception of corruption in Ghana. Corruption has also been politicized and remains an election issues since the return of constitutional rule in 1993. The Constitution Review Commission (CRC) found that “corruption is not in any way a new development in Ghana and observes that the issue of corruption is very rife in national life and has been the subject of many interventions by past and present governments” (Republic of Ghana 2011: 777). As a result, the CRC observes that “there is ample provision in the 1992 Constitution on the issue of corruption” (Republic of Ghana 2011: 781). For instance, Article 35(8) enjoins the State to take steps to eradicate corrupt practices; Article 37(1) directs the State to endeavour to secure and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of... probity and accountability; while Article 218(e) gives the power to the CHRAJ to investigate all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public monies by public officials and to take appropriate steps... resulting from such investigations.

The prevalence of corruption in almost all spheres in Ghana is demonstrated by the country’s performance on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI) which remains below average. Ghana has constantly scored below the average score of 50 with its highest score to date being 48 points out of 100 in 2014, which further dropped to 47 points in 2015. Notwithstanding this, it should be conceded that there has been marginal improvement in Ghana’s CPI score in the last four years, that is, 45 points, 46 points, 48 points and 47 points in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively<sup>7</sup>.

Table 2.1 contains the overall assessment of corruption in Ghana by respondents. As many as 72.1% of respondents rated corruption as “very high” and a further 19.5% as “high”. In contrast, only 4.1% of respondents rated corruption as “low”. This finding is consistent with the evidence and perception of corruption in the country. It also complements the findings of Afrobarometer that 64% of Ghanaians thought that corruption had increased<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> “Ghana CPI rating” accessed June 30, 2016 at <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>

<sup>8</sup> Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. Between 1,200 and 2,400 respondents were interviewed in the language of the respondent’s choice between 2014 and 2015. See “Afrobarometer: Ghana Headed In Wrong Direction – 82% Of Citizens Say”, accessed July 1, 2016 at <http://sankofafm.com/6853-2/>

**Table 2.1: Overall Assessment of Corruption in Ghana**

What is your overall assessment of corruption in Ghana?	Frequency	Percent
<b>Very High</b>	1082	72.3
<b>High</b>	292	19.5
<b>Low</b>	61	4.1
<b>Don't know</b>	62	4.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1497</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs

In addition, the 2012 Auditor General's Report, GH¢2 billion was lost to the state due to financial irregularities by public and statutory organizations which occurred in 2012 alone. They resulted from irregularities in cash and payroll management, tax and procurement, stores and contract irregularities and outstanding debtors, loans and recoverable charges. The state lost more than GH¢116.3 million to cash irregularities arising out of the misapplication of funds, overestimation of funds needed, outstanding imprest, payments not authenticated and cash shortages. Some of the losses have occurred as a result of poor supervision, lack of control, management's failure to review approved budgets and failure to demand receipts for payments made (Republic of Ghana 2012).

The country has recorded a number of high profile corruption cases some of which have been in court or under investigation by the CHRAJ. They include unaccounted huge sums of monies wasted on the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA); the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Authority (GYEEDA); Subah; the National Service Secretariat where the then head is believed to have paid GH¢98 million to non-existent beneficiaries, and dubious judgment debts which prompted the President to set up the

Justice Apau Commission of Enquiry into Judgment Debts, which submitted its report in May 2015. In 2016, the President dismissed the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice – the anti-graft agency when she was found guilty by a five-member committee set up the Chief Justice to investigate allegations of spending USD180,000 on rent and GH¢182,000 to renovate her official residence. In the last quarter of 2015, the then Minister of Transport, resigned after her ministry and the government came under criticism for spending a total of GH¢3.5 million of Ghana's oil money on the rebranding of some Metro Mass Transit buses.

In addition, there is the judicial corruption scandal which was exposed by Tiger Eye. It led to the dismissal by the President of some justices of the High Court and the lower courts with or without benefits depending on the gravity of their offences after their cases were considered by the special five-member committee set up by the Chief Justice to investigate the allegations of corruption which submitted its report to the Judicial Council.

In the face of the accusation of corruption in his government, the current President challenged Ghanaians to mention the persons in his cabinet who were allegedly corrupt so that he can sanction them.

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According to him “All the time people keep expressing that ‘your ministers are robbers’. Then I question them, ‘which one? Tell me so I can sanction them’. Then their reply will be, ‘put your ears down, are you not taking note?’ ”<sup>9</sup> Even though he admitted that fighting corruption is an uphill task he at the same time blamed the liberalized environment for heightened perception of corruption:

*One of the things about countries like Ghana is that creating the environment where people are able to speak freely about corruption, heightens the perception of corruption. So it might be that because of the environment in which corruption is discussed, people have the perception that there is an increase in the perception of corruption*<sup>10</sup>.

On the institutions involved in corruption, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) has been ranked as the most corrupt institution (28.6%), followed by judges and magistrates (18.4%), tax officials (14%); Office of the President (12.9%); and Immigration Service (12.8%) (see Table 2.2). The rating of the police as the most corrupt institution is not surprising as it has featured in similar surveys conducted by Afrobarometer and other think tanks. Police corruption in Ghana may be classified into three forms, namely, (i) street-level bribery and extortion; (ii) bureaucratic corruption; and (iii) criminal corruption (Chene 2010; Ayee 2016(b)). Street-level bribery and extortion, for instance, is the result of interactions with the public on a daily basis and may have created the perception of the GPS as the most corrupt public sector institution.

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<sup>9</sup> “Mahama; Name corrupt persons in my cabinet” accessed July 1, 2016 at <http://www.ghanalive.tv/2016/05/14/mahama-name-corrupt-persons-in-my-cabinet/>

<sup>10</sup> “Fighting Corruption in Ghana is an uphill task” –Mahama speaking on the sidelines of the London Anti-Corruption summit held in May 2016 accessed July 2, 2016 at <http://www.xliveafrica.com>

**Table 2.2: Institutions Involved in Corruption**

No.	How many of the following institutions do you think are involved in corruption?	None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Don't know/ Haven't heard
1.	Office of the President	7.4	46.3	22.8	12.9	10.6
2.	Members of Parliament	4.3	49.4	25.9	11.4	9.1
3.	Government officials	3.2	47.9	31.3	11.4	6.2
4.	Assemblymen and women	10.1	53.8	19.7	8.4	7.9
5.	District Chief Executives	5.0	51.3	24.1	10.3	9.3
6.	Police	2.8	30.3	34.0	28.6	4.2
7.	Army	30.6	41.1	10.4	7.0	11.0
8.	Immigration	4.5	42.9	28.3	12.8	11.5
9.	Tax Officials (i.e. GRA CEPS, IRS, VAT)	3.5	42.7	31.2	14.0	8.7
10.	Judges and Magistrates	2.4	39.3	34.5	18.4	5.4

**Source:** 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs

Furthermore, as we pointed out earlier on, increase in salary does not necessarily result in decline in corruption. The GPS was the first institution to have been migrated onto the SSPP in 2010, with huge salary increases and yet there is still the perception that it is still the most corrupt institution in the country. Perhaps a more fundamental point to make is the contradiction between the GPS as the most corrupt institution on one hand and the institution to which most respondents (87.4%) would contact in reporting corruption (only 12.6% dissented) on the other hand. It seems paradoxical that the mandates of the GPS affect citizens on a daily basis and yet at the same time the frequency of those interactions with the public as a result of the mandates becomes the opportunities for corrupt practices.

The least corrupt institution is the army (7%), which by its operations does not have daily contact with the public unlike the police, and therefore the opportunities for corruption are largely minimized.

Given the proliferation and vibrancy of the media since the return to constitutional rule in 1993 which created political space, it is not surprising that 52.4% of the respondents got information on their level of assessment of corruption from the media, which together with civil society have led the fight in exposing corruption especially through investigative journalism and advocacy. This is followed by “personal experience” (20.8%) and “talk with relatives and family” (14.5%), the figures of which are intriguing given the fact that individuals have a key role to play in fighting corruption (see Table 2.3).

**Table 2.3: Information Source from which Assessment of Corruption was Based**

No.	On which information source do you base your assessment of the level corruption in the country?	Frequency	Percent
1.	Personal experience (you have had to provide cash, gift or favour)	295	20.8
2.	Talk with relatives	206	14.5
3.	Talk with friends and acquaintances	133	9.4
4.	Information on corruption given by NGOs (corruption awareness)	30	2.1
5.	Information provided by the media (TV, radio, newspaper, internet, etc.)	744	52.4
6.	Other (Please specify)	13	.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1421</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs

### ***Combating Corruption***

The philosophy behind efforts to combat corruption is one of eliminating the opportunity for corruption by changing incentives, closing off loopholes and eliminating misconceived rules that encourage corrupt behaviour. However, an approach that focuses solely on changing the rules and the incentives, accompanied by appropriately harsh punishment for violation of the rules, is likely to be far more effective if it is also supported by efforts to buttress the moral and ethical foundation of human behaviour. This is where the role of the individual in fighting corruption becomes handy. Even though it has been acknowledged that fighting corruption should be a collaborative venture, the commitment of the individual to combat corruption is key because corruption starts from the individual.

Accordingly, respondents were given an opportunity to state what role they can play in the fight against corruption. To combat corruption, respondents were asked to indicate how they will personally reduce corruption. Majority of respondents (64.3%) indicated abstention from paying bribes for public services is the most important step. This is followed by “report corrupt officials’ behaviour to authorities” (27.3%), “report corruption in the press” (21.7%), “participate in awareness campaigns against corruption” (15.1%), and “refuse to make favours to officials or to their relatives related with my job” (13.2%) (see Table 3.1). The majority response once again falls within the domain of morals and ethics. Abstention from paying bribes is good, however, one wonders if it can really be practiced in a tempting environment such as Ghana where there are numerous opportunities for engaging in corrupt practices.

**Table 3.1: Respondents Personally Reducing Corruption in Ghana**

No.	In your opinion, what can you personally do to reduce corruption in Ghana?	No	Yes
1.	Abstain from paying bribes for public services	35.7	64.3
2.	Report corruption in the press	78.3	21.7
3.	Refuse to make favours to officials or to their relatives related with my job	86.8	13.2
4.	Report corrupt behaviour of public officials to NGO anticorruption centre	92.7	7.3
5.	Report corrupt officials behaviour to complete authorities	72.7	27.3
6.	File lawsuit against the corrupt official	92.7	7.3
7.	Participate in awareness campaigns against corruption	84.9	15.1
8.	Participate and supporting an anticorruption educational campaign	87.1	12.9
9.	There is nothing I can do	93.9	6.1

**Source:** 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs

To what extent can corruption be reduced in Ghana? This is the question put to the respondents to gauge either their optimism or pessimism about corruption. The majority response is that “corruption can be reduced to a limited degree” (44%), while 24.7% responded that “corruption cannot be reduced at all”, followed by “corruption can be substantially reduced” (19.9%). However, a paltry 4.7% responded that “corruption can be completely eradicated” (see Table 3.2). The majority view reflects some pessimism about reducing corruption largely because of the pervasive and systemic nature of corruption in Ghana.

There is therefore a feeling of fatalism on combating and reducing corruption. Perhaps this fatalism may be mitigated by the NACAP’s three-prong approach to the fight against corruption, namely, (i) prevention; (ii) education; and (iii) investigation and enforcement. These should be backed by sustained commitment to, and ownership of, the NACAP by each Ghanaian and all other stakeholders in Ghana’s development process (Republic of Ghana 2014).



**Table 3.2: The Extent of Reducing Corruption in Ghana**

No.	To what extent do you think corruption can be reduced in Ghana?	Frequency	Percent
1.	Corruption cannot be reduced at all	363	24.7
2.	Corruption can be reduced to a limited degree	660	44.9
3.	Corruption can be substantially reduced	292	19.9
4.	Corruption can be completely eradicated	70	4.8
5.	Refused	3	0.2
6.	Don't know	81	5.5
7.	<b>Total</b>	<b>1469</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs

## Conclusion

Is the Ghanaian concept and perception of corrupt different from certain internationally accepted notions of corruption? How widespread are such concepts and how do they perpetuate the abuse of public office for personal gain? In addressing these questions, the paper captures the data on views of respondents on causes and level or extent of corruption as well as combating corruption. There is some evidence to show that traditional and cultural values and practices may not necessarily be the major cause of corruption in Ghana. This seems to have contradicted the view that societal expectations of largesse and patronage from those in public office combined with a culture of impunity are deeply rooted in Ghanaian society and political culture and therefore one of the causes of corruption (Republic of Ghana 2014).

The paper has rather found that there is a plethora of factors that have contributed to the prevalence and upsurge of corruption.

The findings show that most Ghanaians are reasonably willing to report incidents of corruption whenever they encounter them. There is no doubt that increased awareness and change in attitude is stoking up levels of intolerance to corruption and steadily converting into readiness and empowerment to act against corruption. Thus, the efforts by the media, civil society, CHRAJ and NCCE and other stakeholders need to be sustained, and, where necessary, escalated in order to reach the desire levels sooner.

This progress notwithstanding, there are still lingering challenges of ignorance, lack of proper facilitation, fear of victimization and fear of authorities.

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## Policy Recommendations

From the above observations, the following policy recommendations can be made:

**i. Information is Power:** It has been pointed out that information dissemination to citizens enables them to monitor public service delivery and expenditure which influences the attitudes and behaviour of public officials. Even though there is a public officer's asset declaration regime, it does not work because the procedure is confidential as the declaration is concealed in an envelope and submitted to the Auditor General, who is legally debarred from opening it. This raises questions over monitoring and publication. The lack of information on both assets declaration has undermined efforts to promote transparency and accountability and thereby created opportunities for rent-seeking activities by public officials as well as contributing to the ineffectiveness of the public service.

**ii. Bipartisan Approach to Fight Corruption:** The challenges of insulating national issues from partisan considerations is a big challenge in Ghana. Extreme politicization and partisanship have been the bane of Ghanaian politics since the return to constitutional rule in 1993. Fighting corruption has been politicized in the country and has as well become an election issue since the return to constitutional rule in 1993. In the words of the current President: "It is easy to say that there is more corruption in this system than that regime; but where will contrast of regimes take us? It won't take us anywhere. The essential thing is to put in the systems that avoid corruption from taking place and then have the political will to expose it, explore it, and sanction it."<sup>11</sup>

Combating corruption entails the adoption of a bipartisan approach to confront the scourge. The executive and parliament should take the lead in this matter as the two issues have been politicized.

**iii. Develop a Culture and Ethos of Integrity, Transparency and Accountability:** There should be the development and cultivation of a culture and ethos of integrity, transparency and accountability. This entails a re-engineering of some negative traditional values and norms. Certain traditional values and norms (such as deference to authority) impede the expression of citizens' voice and the exercise of citizens' rights. The traditional system is strongly ingrained with respect for authority, leadership, and elders. Ordinary citizens (and especially women, the youth, and poor people) are not accustomed to requesting information or questioning authority. The cultivation of this culture should be done through a coordinated public education programme.

**iv. Improvement in the Overall Governance Situation in Ghana:** Bipartisanship and the development of a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability are also intended to contribute to an improvement in the overall governance situation in Ghana. An environment where, for example, ethical standards for public officials are enforced; where there is efficient public sector delivery; where there is public service transparency and accountability; where there is non-wasteful public resource management; where the media plays an effective role in demanding clean government and highlights cases of

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<sup>11</sup>Fight against corruption. It's partnership of the willing but I've never taken bribe — Mahama <http://www.graphiconlinenews.com/news/general-news/fight-against-corruption-it-s-partnership-of-the-willing-but-i-ve-never-taken-bribe-mahama.html>

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corruption with objectivity and evidence; where there is a robust civil society creating social revulsion and resistance to corruption and where these are regarded as a collective action problem.

**v. Fighting Corruption must be seen from a Long-term Perspective:** This is because “fundamental change demands sustained effort, commitment and leadership over many generations. Mistakes and set backs are a normal and inevitable part of the process. The big challenge is to seize upon mistakes as learning opportunities, rather than use them as excuses for squashing reform” in this case, combating corruption (Schacter 2000: 10).

**vi. Training and Education on ethics and Ethical Behaviour** in the wider context of good governance, now needs to be a compulsory part of the learning curricula in all schools and centers of learning and training, from primary through to university, teacher colleges, and vocational and other training institutes. Unethical practices have become a way of life in Ghana and are tolerated by the communities. Consequently, influencing the hearts and minds of the young will probably do much more to change the socialization process that promotes corruption and unethical behaviour, than all other measures combined. Therefore, the fight against unethical behaviour and practices through sensitization of the young must be given priority.

**vii. Transformational Leadership:** What is required is leadership for change, or in other words, transformational leadership. Such leaders must also be regarded as champions of ideas—good ideas in this case for reducing the wage bill and the multiple pay regimes—who lead and maintain commitment to change ideas and transform

toward a better governance environment, influencing others into accepting the changes, implementing the NACAP, building the capacity of institutions involved in combating corruption and coordinating with disparate actors to overcome resistance to change and transformation as far as corruption is concerned. These leadership actions are intended to ultimately enhance the acceptance and institutionalization of transformational change in anti-corruption for the better.

**viii. Use of Some Traditional and Cultural Values to Fight Corruption:** Policy makers can use the cultural aspects of corruption as a guide for adopting a strategic perspective to fight corruption, when implementing anticorruption policy reforms. Hence, policy reforms advocated for tackling corruption must consider the cultural connection to corruption in their design even though we have argued that traditional values are used as a mask to cover the major causes of corruption. The media, education system, politicians, traditional leaders as well as civil society organizations therefore need to contribute their quota to the use of some traditional values and practices that are germane to fighting against corruption.

**ix. Use of Smart Technology or E-Governance:** Poor recording keeping and inadequate information create avenues or opportunities for corruption. Accordingly, there is the need to use smart technology or e-governance to reduce corruption. It has been noted that frequent, direct contact between government officials and citizens can open the way for illicit transactions. One way to address this problem is to use readily available technologies to encourage more of an arms-length relation between officials, citizens and civil society. In this connection, the Internet has proved to be an effective tool to reduce corruption (Andersen et. al.

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2011). The development and implementation of e-government is one of the most relevant and important evolutions for public administration. In recent years, governments in many countries have made efforts to increase their openness and transparency. E-governance is used, being considered an efficient and effective means to improve public transparency and reduce corruption (Mistry 2012).

**x. Additional Pressure from Civil Society and Development Partners:** Until the Right to Information Bill is passed by Parliament and assented to by the President, the public, civil society and media would remain frustrated in getting the necessary information on public service delivery, assets declaration of public officials and other transactions which generally lead to corruption. It is poignant to note that Parliament at its last meeting before it adjourned *sine die* in November 2016 failed to pass the Right to Information Bill because of multiplicity of amendments which cannot be harmonized. Accordingly, development partners (DPs) and civil society have an important role to play in putting pressure on the Government of Ghana (GoG) to ensure that corruption is minimized and contained.

In addition, the advocacy of civil society is important in goading Parliament to expedite action on the passage of the Right to Information Bill in the next session of Parliament in 2017.

**xi. Implement recommendations of the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament on sanctioning public officials who have been found to have engaged in corrupt practices.** The Auditor General and the PAC have over the years lamented the pervasive nature of corruption in the public service. The Auditor General, for instance, has repeatedly expressed frustration in his annual report at the inability of the executive to punish officials who were found to be corrupt. In a speech read in October 2015 at the 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Audit Service Accountability Lectures, the Auditor General charged the judiciary to ensure that public officers who engage in corruption and waste state resources should be punished without fear or favour. This will end the impunity with which government officials plunder state resources usually seen in the Auditor General's reports (Auditor General 2015).

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