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DEALING WITH GHANA'S WINNER-TAKES-ALL POLITICS: THE CASE FOR PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The Winner – Takes- All (WTA) Politics project is an initiative of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). The WTA project forms part of a larger governance research project which dates back to 2014. The aim of this project is to promote a “More inclusive and accountable system of Governance in Ghana”. At the end of an almost two year consultation and research process a report was produced by

the IEA WTA Advisory Committee and the Board.

A copy of the Winner -Takes -All Politics report was submitted to The President of Ghana and disseminated to key stakeholders. All subsequent papers on the subject including this paper have been developed based on themes/issues identified in the final report.

Presented by Dr. Ransford Gyampo¹

Summary

This paper is the fifth in a series of publications aimed at contributing to the discourse on the “Winner-Takes-All” politics in Ghana. Even though political parties are the “heart and soul” of multiparty democracy, they seem much neglected in many developing countries by the state. They exist and operate like private institutions without much support from the state. Consequently, they are unable to attract the right caliber of personnel to man their activities and their secretariats in between elections. More importantly, a political party that loses election “loses everything” and wallows in “the hell of opposition”. How does the lack of access to public funding by political parties promote the Winner-Takes-All politics? This paper discusses public funding of political parties and how the lack of it, could promote some of the negative effects of the Winner-Takes-All politics. It assesses the popularity of the idea of public funding of political parties in Ghana and Africa and calls for the implementation of the IEA-sponsored Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008 as one key solution to the Winner-Takes-All politics.

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The Editor, The Institute of Economic Affairs, P. O. Box OS 1936, Accra.
Tel. +233-302 244716/ 226333 / 226359 / 226388 / 030 7010713/4.
Email: iea@ieagh.org Website: www.ieagh.org

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Introduction

Democratization across the world has influenced the formation of many political parties particularly in transitional democracies¹. These political parties, according to Chibber and Kollman, Apter, and Bofo-Arthur,² can be described as the kingpins of democracy because they perform key roles in the formation of government, grooming of leaders at national and sub-national levels, and holding governments accountable when they are in opposition. However, in Ghana, political parties are among the most neglected state political institutions.³ They operate like purely private organizations with no state or national interest in their establishment, maintenance and well-being.⁴ Ideally, political parties must not just operate as machines for churning out electoral victories, but also function effectively as vehicles for public education, leadership training, national integration and skills acquisition during inter-election periods.⁵ This is especially the case where Article 55, Section 3 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution mandates political parties to shape the political will of the people, disseminate information on socio-economic and political ideas and sponsor candidates for elections to any public office other

than District Assemblies or lower local government units. Performing these tasks requires much funding. On the average, it costs GHS100,000 to run political parties in all two-third districts of the country a month during off-peak or inter-election periods. However during peak periods or electioneering campaign season, it could cost as much as GHS800,000 a month on the average, to run political parties in Ghana.⁶ Table 1 shows the average cost and some expenditure patterns of political parties in Ghana during off-peak seasons

Tables 1&2 give examples of just a few of the huge costs and expenditures of political parties in Ghana. During peak seasons, for instance, political parties mount several giant billboards across the country. As Table 2 shows, the cost of one giant billboard on the average is GHS3,000 for only one month. After one month, the party must pay for the advertising space of the billboard. Again, the average cost of a one-slot newspaper advert is GHS1,000. Also, vehicles purchased for campaign purposes are expected to be fueled and maintained. Where does the money come from? The only sources of public financial support for political parties in Ghana are the indirect support of not taxing their incomes and the direct support of allocating a few vehicles in election years to

Table 1: Some Cost and Expenditure Patterns of Political Parties in Ghana During Off-Peak Period

SEASON	EXPENDITURE	AVERAGE MONTHLY COST IN GHANA CEDIS (GHS)
Off-Peak Inter-Election Period	Renting and Maintenance of Office Space	2,500
	Salary for at least three office Staff	8,000
	Utility Bills Donations at Social Events	7,000 10,000
	Incidentals to cater for the financial demands of party	15,000

Source: Separate Interview Sessions with the Campaign Managers of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party

The expenditure and costs incurred by political parties tend to increase astronomically in election years. Table 2 shows some additional cost and expenditure pattern of political parties during peak seasons.

Table 2: Some Additional Cost and Expenditure Patterns of Political Parties in Ghana during Peak Period

SEASON	EXPENDITURE	AVERAGE COST IN GHANA CEDIS (GHS)
Peak Electioneering Campaign Period	Mounting of Billboards	3,000 per bill board for a month
	Newspaper Advertisement	1,000 per advert
	Radio Advertisement	800 per slot
	TV Advertisement	900per slot
	Printing of T-Shirts	15,000 per thousand pieces
	Printing of Posters/Fliers	10,000 per thousand pieces
	Donating at least one vehicle to each of the 275 constituencies in the country	150,000 per vehicle

Source: Separate Interview Sessions with the Campaign Managers of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party

those participating in the elections through the Electoral Commission. Also per Article 55 (11) of the 1992 Constitution, the state is required to support political parties in kind by providing fair opportunity to all parties to present their programmes to the public. This means ensuring equal access by all political parties to the state-owned media. In this regard, political parties in Ghana have since 1996 been given free air time by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to campaign and broadcast their policy prescriptions to the people. Furthermore, from 1996 to 2008, the government through the Electoral Commission (EC) donated vehicles to political parties contesting elections. For instance, in 2008, the EC donated 50 vehicles to political parties that fielded parliamentary candidates in more than ten constituencies.⁷ Unfortunately, this gesture ended in 2008. Political parties are therefore expected to find the means to procure vehicles for their activities during off-peak seasons and campaign period. The Political Parties' Act, 2000 bans parties from seeking foreign funds to run their

activities. Membership dues paid to parties account for only 2% of the cost of running their activities. Even though the financial contributions of individual donors and financiers within the country could account for about 35% of the cost of running party activities, these contributions are made only during the peak campaign season.⁸ So, how do political parties sustain themselves during off-peak period? Will the paucity of funding available to Ghanaian political parties enable them to perform their roles? The answer obviously is not in the affirmative and this serves as a recipe for violent electoral competition, usually a characteristic of the Winner-Takes-All politics.

Against this backdrop, this paper discusses the relationship between underfunding of parties and the Winner-Takes-All politics in Ghana. It reviews the features of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)-sponsored Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008 as a possible solution to WTA politics and assesses the popularity of the proposal for public funding of political parties in

Ghana. Finally, it offers policy recommendations regarding how best political parties can benefit from public funding as one key antidote to the Winner-Takes-All politics.

Public Funding of Political Parties Explained

Public funding of political parties is an arrangement that enables the state to give financial resources or indirect assistance to political parties in order to enable them run their activities and achieve their ultimate objective of capturing political power and implement policies that would better the lots of the ordinary people.⁹ Even though the terms “public funding” and “state funding” may be used interchangeably, a distinction is drawn between them in this paper. In public funding, sources of funds to political parties are from the state itself as well as from other sources such as donations from private individuals and corporate entities. . On the other hand, in state funding, all financial allocations to political parties emanate from only the state.¹⁰ Financing political party activities is usually from public taxes and private contributions of individuals and corporate entities. Countries like Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and countries in post-communist Eastern Europe practice some form of public funding of political parties. In Africa, countries like Lesotho, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana have some arrangements for the state to fund political parties. In Botswana, for instance, parliament adopted a motion to fund political parties in 2013.¹¹

The result of the increased use of the mass media and more cost-intensive campaigning techniques has rendered the running of political parties a very expensive venture. Again, in their quest to professionalize their internal activities and to run effectively, political parties in many parts of the world are manned by full-time staff. Given that these full-time party employees are to be paid salaries, the need for some form of arrangement to ensure regular cash flow for the parties cannot be under-estimated.¹² Unfortunately, even though political parties need more funds to play their role in shaping multi-party democracy at all seasons, most of them, particularly in opposition, do not

have the funds to even maintain themselves.¹³ In recent years, many political parties in many democracies have suffered from a growing disengagement of citizens from conventional politics. This has led to a decline in membership of political parties and deprived parties of an important source of revenue by reducing significantly the amount of income derived from membership subscriptions.¹⁴ However Biezen¹⁵ argues that parties in modern democracies cannot reasonably be expected to generate all necessary funding by themselves. In this regard, the state must intervene to provide financial support to political parties.

The criteria for allocating funds to political parties by the state vary from country to country. They include the number of votes cast for a political party in an election and the number of parliamentary seats obtained in an election, the size of a party's membership as well as the party's ability to field and secure the election of an agreed percentage or number of marginalized groups such as women, youth, or the physically challenged into the legislature or other decision-making bodies of state as an affirmative action.¹⁶ Public funding of political parties must find a synthesis between private and public financing of internal party affairs and external activities. If parties rely only on private contributions, certain private individuals may hijack the party. On the other hand, excessive reliance on public funding can weaken the relationship between parties and their electorates.¹⁵ It is, therefore, imperative that parties strive to seek support from both sources or else they will lose funds. Too much reliance on funds from the state could erode the party's link with society and undermine the party's legitimacy.¹⁷ In the current context of an increasing disengagement of society from party politics and a growing reluctance to donate money to them, parties may find it extremely difficult to raise funds. The availability of money from the state, moreover, may make it seem unnecessary for parties to raise money through private or voluntary fundraising and this may ultimately spell doom for the party.¹⁸ Generally, there should be some rules that must guide the distribution of funds by the state to political parties. These rules

may require political parties to disclose their sources of income and expenditure and publish their party accounts. The rules may provide for an independent audit, inspection and control of party funds and accounts as well as mechanisms that ensure that blueprints on funding of political parties are adhered to.¹⁹

In spite of its potential contribution to the fight against WTA politics, public funding of political parties has several challenges. First, it increases the tax burden and forces taxpayers to offer financial support to parties that they do not politically support.²⁰ In many developing countries, as a result of fighting the quagmire of poverty and under-development, it is considered politically unwise for the government to spend the tax-payer's money on political parties when there are pressing “bread and butter” challenges confronting the ordinary people.²¹ Secondly, public funding is also regarded as dangerous because it could increase the distance between the political elite and the citizen who is to be represented.²² After state support, political parties may relax in their membership drive and cease to actively campaign for new membership. This may eventually lead to the “dictatorship” of party leaders over members and the sidelining of members from party decision-making.²³

Underfunding of Political Parties in Ghana and WTA Politics

As discussed in previous papers, the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) politics is that polarizing practice that grants certain exclusive rights to the top governing party echelon and apparatchiks after elections to the neglect of the rest of the citizenry, particularly the opposition. Under the WTA politics, victorious political parties after elections quickly “sweep the political and economic stakes” of the state as they consolidate themselves in power.²⁴ Consequently, only the ruling party becomes more visible in between elections because of its access to state resources. Indeed, during election campaign periods, an uneven playing field is created as the party in power exploits its incumbency and access to state resources while those in opposition operate virtually in oblivion due to limited financial

resources. Some of the parties in opposition are unable to mount billboards, print fliers, or procure other party paraphernalia to facilitate their campaigns. They are also unable to tour the entire country to campaign due to limited funds. In the absence of a Public Funding of Political Parties Act, there is limited information regarding funds parties are able to raise for their activities as they are unwilling to make such public disclosures. However, the funding challenges confronting parties in opposition not only undermine their effectiveness but are also a clear manifestation of the financial suffocation they experience. Highlighting the funding challenges that confront political parties, particularly in opposition, Ekow Spio-Garbrah, a former minister of state in the Jerry Rawlings administration, on 13th April, 2002, at the Central Regional Delegates Congress of the NDC, described life in opposition as “hell and not easy” after his party had lost the 2000 General Elections. Ruling parties are able to campaign across the length and breadth of the country with ease due to their access to state resources and funds.²⁵

The opposition parties also remain inactive during inter-election periods and are unable to establish and maintain offices in many parts of the country because of the financial challenges they face. The few financiers who are able to fund party activities often take the advantage to hijack the political parties and control their decision-making processes in a manner that undermines internal democracies of the parties.²⁶ Furthermore, in deciding who must lead the party at both the presidential and parliamentary levels, money becomes one of the major deciding factors.²⁷ The parties charge huge nomination fees that deter those who do not have the financial muscle to file their nominations. Table 3, for instance, shows the 2016 nomination fees for the presidential aspirants of the four main political parties with representation in parliament, namely, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP), Convention People's Party (CPP) and People's National Convention (PNC).

Table 3: Table Depicting the Nomination Fee for the Presidential Aspirants of the Four Main Parliamentary Parties in Ghana

Political Party	Nomination Fee (GHS)
NDC	50,000
NPP	85,000
CPP	155,000
PNC	10,500

Source: Separate Telephone Interviews with the General Secretaries of the Four Main Political Parties with Representation in Parliament on 10th July 2016.

After paying such huge fees, candidates are expected to also “buy” the votes of the citizenry, particularly at the constituency level in order to receive some assurance of electoral victory.²⁸ These tendencies result in massive corruption as the winning candidates concentrate on re-gaining funds spent during the filing of their nominations and campaign “through all manner of corrupt means.”²⁹

The collateral effect of the above is that elections become “a do-or-die” affair – one of the dangerous and negative effects of the WTA politics. The party that wins power would be able to run its activities and maintain itself at all times because of access to and monopoly over state resources. Therefore, the contest and competition for power necessarily become keen and unhealthy in a manner that sparks violence and threatens democratic relapse. Again, if the state were to be providing funding for parties, the latter would be able to marshal the needed resources to properly organize congresses such that no individual aspirant would have the opportunity to camp delegates and bribe them. It is the gloomy funding picture of political parties in Ghana and its attendant effect of making elections a “do-or-die” affair that justifies the call for some form of public funding of political parties. Besides, there can be no meaningful discussion of strengthening the pillars of multi-party democracy without dealing with gross underfunding that continues to plague political parties.

The Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008 - Background and Main Features

In June 2006, the IEA initiated a move to have enacted a Public Funding of Political Parties Act that will provide state and other public financial support for political parties in Ghana. In furtherance of this initiative, the IEA prepared the initial proposals for the bill. Thereafter, a legal consultant was commissioned to prepare a Draft Bill on Public Funding of Political Parties. The draft bill was subjected to nation-wide stakeholder consultations. Apart from these consultations, two separate workshops were held in Kumasi and Accra, during which various proposals for amendments were made.³⁰ Some of the proposals were incorporated into the draft bill.³¹ The final proposed Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008, has the following as its major features:

- The establishment of a Political Parties Fund;
- The principal source of money for the Fund is two and half percent of the total tax revenue of Ghana;
- Other corporate entities and private individuals can also contribute to the Fund;
- The Fund is to be administered by the Electoral Commission;
- A formula for the disbursement of the Fund comprising the reimbursement for electoral expenses and general administration;
- An Affirmative Action provision to encourage political parties to field women candidates in elections;
- A provision that exempts the Fund from taxation; and
- A provision for an annual audit of the Fund and annual reports to parliament.³²

The Bill was submitted to the executive on January 16, 2010. It was then expected to be considered by the executive and, thereafter, forwarded to parliament to be passed into law. Regrettably, it has still not moved past the executive six years after submission because there seems to be no political will to create a level playing field for electoral competition and the inability of many Ghanaians to welcome the idea of public funding for political parties.³³

Is Public Funding a Truly Welcoming Proposal in Ghana?

Even though opinion was divided on the issue of funding of political parties in their deliberations, the Committee of Experts whose recommendations led to the drafting of the 1992 Constitution agreed on the desirability of the state making contributions in kind to the campaign expenses of political parties.³⁴ In this regard, the Committee recommended that:

...all candidates for the presidency be given the same amount of time on radio and television, and the same amount of space in the state-owned newspapers. In respect of persons seeking election to parliament, we recommend that, without prejudice to their right to conduct their own campaigns, the state should provide a common platform for all the candidates in each district to present their programmes to the people and answer questions and queries on them...³⁵

It must be noted that the Committee of Experts only recommended state funding in kind for political parties during peak election season. How political parties would operate in-between elections to play their other important roles was not catered for. Following extensive nation-wide public consultations, between 2010 and 2011, Ghana's Constitution Review Commission (CRC) recommended public funding for political parties that would cater for the needs of parties at all seasons. The CRC observed as follows:

...it is not rare to find political parties in Ghana going dormant in-between elections or being dominated by a few personalities because they are the chief financiers of the parties. To keep political parties competitive and to ensure that they effectively play their role as important actors in Ghana's democratic process, it would be desirable to adopt a mixture of public and private funding of political parties. Public funding would create a level playing field and create more equitable conditions among the parties...³⁶

However, the government did not seem too keen in its response to this recommendation. In the White Paper on the CRC Report, the "Government notes the Constitution Review

Commission's recommendation for administrative action on this issue"³⁷ Merely noting this recommendation does not necessarily mean acceptance and implementation. The fact that the draft Public Funding of Political Parties' Bill has remained with the presidency for over six years without being forwarded to parliament for passage into law, perhaps indicates the extent to which ruling governments in Ghana and, indeed, many African countries, are unwilling to ensure a level playing field for the opposition, in terms of electoral competition.

Generally, political parties in power in Africa tend to operate in a neo-patrimonial context, a situation where all powers, resources and largesse are expected to flow from the state. With the exception of a few proactive African countries that have introduced some customized variant of public funding of political parties, the vast majority of African leaders prefer to use state power and resources only to the advantage of party supporters in a manner that promotes all manner of corrupt practices through blatant looting of state resources as well as facilitate the divisive phenomenon of the "Winner-Takes-All politics."³⁸ Indeed, Bayart had already written about *belly politics*, in which, similar to neo-patrimonialism, the state gives support to only those who are cronies of the government.³⁹ This multi-faceted metaphor arose in Africa after independence and was generally characterized by a controlling government and the interdependence of the elite in control of the private and public spheres.⁴⁰ Under this kind of prebendal politics, actors on both sides use their status to strengthen their economic and political power. Nigeria's postcolonial experience is perhaps the most apt example of the politics of the belly. The countless coups and ethnic and religious clashes in the oil-rich Delta region are all underpinned by a cabal of high-ranking military personnel that demonstrates the networked nepotism characteristic of Bayart's metaphor. Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha gained notoriety for this practice with Abacha in his four-year term, embezzling over USD four billion.⁴¹ Babangida also institutionalized corruption and amassed fortunes sufficient to make him one of Nigeria's richest people. He reserved many government jobs and funds for

only his ethnic kinsmen and those who supported him.⁴²

In Ghana, too, the lack of political will to pass the *Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008* is a typical manifestation of the practice of the “belly politics” that has plagued African countries after independence. In this regard, democratization in Ghana has not served as a countervailing check on the practice of neo-patrimonialism, as argued by Lindberg.⁴³ Indeed, the unwillingness or lack of political will on the part of elected politicians in Ghana to ensure some form of funding for all parties in order to create a level playing field during electoral competition and their desire to use resources of the state only to the advantage of their clients reflect their neo-patrimonial nature and the practice of “belly politics” in Africa as a whole. It is also a way of keeping the opposition poor and depriving them of the needed resources to be able to challenge or match the ruling party in terms of electoral campaign.⁴⁴ Public funding of political parties may have been introduced in countries, particularly African countries, for peculiar reasons and under different conditions.⁴⁵ The idea may therefore not be “swallowed, hook, line and sinker.” South Africa, at the fall of the apartheid régime, was eager to include the black majority in mainstream politics and further place them on the same scale so as to close the gap between the well-resourced white politician and the vibrant, but ill-resourced black politician. One of the ways of achieving this aim was to fund the political parties from public funds. Be that as it may, the glaring economic disparity between Ghana and the Republic of South Africa needs no protracted comments. In Zimbabwe too, it is only the Mugabe-led ruling party (ZANU-PF) that receives public funding. In Mali, public funding was introduced to whip up general interest in politics and to entrench multi-party democracy but this has led to an unnecessary proliferation of mushroom parties that rather drains the resources of the state. In Botswana, even though parliament adopted a motion to fund political parties in 2013, government has virtually refused to fund the opposition parties because according to Joseph Balise “there are other serious pressing commitments to focus on.”⁴⁶

The proposal for public funding of political parties in Ghana may seem outmoded at conception because of its unpopularity in view of the prevailing economic hardships⁴⁷ and the lack of political will⁴⁸ to implement such a law due to the perception of public funding as being a dangerous weapon for political opponents by ruling regimes.⁴⁹ The idea was first discussed in 1996 during the Jerry Rawlings regime at a cabinet meeting and “was killed because the zero-sum game of politics in Ghana does not make it wise for the ruling government to empower the opposition.”⁵⁰ Political parties in opposition clamored for it but developed cold feet about it when they got power because they saw public funding as a dangerous arsenal to their real or perceived political opponents.⁵¹ It is to be conceded that the proposal for public funding of political parties may be unpopular. Nevertheless, this should certainly not be the reason why the bill should not be passed into law as bitter pills and austerity measures ultimately pay for the health of a nation. The introduction of several bills and initiatives in Ghana since 1992 has met stiff opposition from the public, and yet these initiatives have been implemented successfully because of government's commitment and support for them. Indeed, the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) in Ghana in 1995 was met with severe opposition from the public. It culminated in a series of demonstrations that led to some casualties and eventual withdrawal of the original VAT Act. Given the government's resilience and commitment to the VAT, it introduced a new VAT Act, albeit, with some modifications and reduction in the original threshold.⁵²

Conclusion/Policy Recommendations

There has been grave concern about the dangers of the WTA politics to Ghana's democratic sustenance and stability. So long as winners of elections continue to deprive the opposition of the needed resources that allow them to function outside political power, elections would remain a highly competitive and contentious business. As has occurred in almost all elections in Ghana since 1992, Ghanaians would continue to rush to prayer camps to pray for peace in the lead up to elections

and many would continue to store all manner of food items against possible conflict. Indeed, the threat of democratic relapse would continue to be heightened so long as access to power confers uneven resource advantage to the ruling party and deprives the opposition of the much needed financial support. What could relieve the problem is public funding of political parties which could also serve to reduce the growing “monetization” in Ghanaian politics and the abuse of incumbency by politicians. Public funding would also help the parties to play their required roles and function effectively at all times, not merely as “election machines” but also agents of political socialization, interest aggregation and interest articulation. It is therefore recommended that:

- The IEA-sponsored draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008 should be expeditiously considered by the executive and sent to parliament to be passed into law and implemented. For this to happen, The IEA should continue to lobby both the executive and parliament through its institutionalized and credible Ghana Political Parties' Programme.
- In order to avoid the proliferation of political parties, beneficiaries must show a credible track record to qualify for funding.
- Most funds must also be in kind rather than in cash and geared towards political education, training of agents and allied equipment of empowerment which cannot be applied to individual/selfish benefit.
- There should be a ceiling on the amount of cash and other resources in kind that can be spent by political parties. Given the average expenditure of about GHS800,000 a month spent by political parties as unearthed by this study, it is proposed that no political party should spend more than this amount per month during peak election campaign season.
- One major issue raised against state funding of political parties is that government has over the years not been able to honor its statutory financial obligations such as the Ghana Education Trust Fund, District Assemblies Common Fund, etc. Consequently, the state may not be able to honor its financial obligations to political parties even if there is state funding of political parties.⁵³ However, it is in recognition of the limitations of state

funding that influenced the call for public funding by this study. As indicated earlier, public funding broadens the source of funds for political parties to include individuals and corporate entities within the state. This contrasts state funding whose source of funds would emanate only from the state. Consequently, even if the state is unable to generate funds, the contributions from private sources and corporate entities may be sufficient in keeping political parties functioning at all times. Where there is a will, there is a way. Where there is commitment to public funding by politicians in power to create a level playing field for electoral competition, as well as reduce political tension, unhealthy competition, rancor and acrimony usually associated with WTA politics, there would certainly be a way out.

Notes

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² See P.K. Chhibber and K. Kollman, *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 45; David Apter, “Ghana,” in *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, eds. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 21; Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Political Parties and Democratic Sustainability in Ghana, 1992-2000,” in *African Political Parties: Evolution, Industrialization and Governance*, ed. Mohammed M. A. Salih (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 52.

³ Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), *Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008* (Accra: IEA-Ghana, 2008), 2.

⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁵ Kwame Ninsin, *Political Parties and Political Participation in Ghana* (Accra: Konrad Adenauer

Foundation, 2006), 18.

⁶ Telephone interview with Peter Mac Manu, former National Chairman of the New Patriotic Party and Campaign Chairman of the New Patriotic Party for the 2016 General Elections in Accra on 10th July 2016. Interview with Johnson Asiedu Nketiah, General Secretary and Campaign Chairman of the National Democratic Congress in Accra on 11th July 2016.

⁷ See www.ec.gov.gh

⁸ Interview with Mac Manu and Asiedu Nketiah

⁹ Saffu, “The Funding of Political Parties and Campaigns in Africa,” 96.

¹⁰ See IEA Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill, 2008. Also See Joseph Ayee, Felix Anebo and Emmanuel Debrah. *Financing Political Parties in Ghana* (Dakar: The Consortium for Development. 2008).

¹¹ ISSER, *The State of the Ghanaian Economy, 2012*, 54.

¹² Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies*, 81.

¹³ Heidenheimer, *Comparative Political Finance*, 99.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See more details at <http://en-starafrica.com/news/botswana-mps-adopt-political-party-funding-motion.html>.

¹⁶ Richard Gillespie “Party Funding in a New Democracy: Spain” in *Funding Democratization*, eds. Peter Burnell and Alan Ware (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 85.

¹⁷ Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies*, 85.

¹⁸ Richard Katz, “Party Organizations and Finance,” in *Comparing Democracies: Elections*

and Voting in Global Perspective, eds. Lawrence Le Duc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris (London: Sage, 1996), 86.

¹⁹ Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies*, 71.

²⁰ Nassmacher, “Introduction,” 78; Michael J. Malbin, *Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 20.

²¹ Frank J. Sorauf, *Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990), 81.

²² Petak Zdravko, “A Comparative Analysis of Financing Parties and Elections in Croatia and other Countries” *Politička Misao*, Vol. XXXVIII, (2001), No. 5, 18–33

²³ Ruud Koole, “The modesty of Dutch party finance” in *Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s*, ed. Herbert E. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 214.

²⁴ Peter Burnell, “Money and Politics in Emerging Democracies” in *Funding Democratization*, eds. Peter Burnell and Alan Ware (New York: Manchester University Press), 15.

²⁵ See Abotsi, E.K. “Rethinking the Winner-Takes-All System” Paper Presented at a Constitutional Review Series Roundtable organized by the IEA in Accra on 21st August, 2013.

²⁶ See the IEA, *Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill*, (Accra: IEA), 3.

²⁷ See Heidenheimer, *Comparative Political Finance*, 103

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies*, 88.

³⁰ ibid

³¹ See the IEA, *Draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill*, 4.

³² Ibid, 5.

³³ R.E.V. Gyampo. "Public Funding of Political Parties in Ghana: An Outmoded Conception?" *Ufahamu: Journal of African Studies* Vol. 38, Issue 2, (winter, 2015), p.10.

³⁴ Republic of Ghana, Report of the Committee of Experts (Constitution) on Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana presented to the PNDC July 31, 1991

³⁵ Ibid, 111

³⁶ Republic of Ghana, "Report of the Constitution Review Commission Presented to the President in 2011" available at <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/reports/650-report-of-the-constitution-review-commission> (accessed On 21st April 2016, p.424.

³⁷ Republic of Ghana, "White Paper on the Report of the Constitutional Review Commission Presented to the President in 2012" available at www.ghana.gov.gh/...2572-white-paper-on-the-report-of-the-constitution-review-commission-presented-to-the-president. (accessed on 5th March, 2016), p. 30.

³⁸ Gyampo. "Public Funding of Political Parties in Ghana: An Outmoded Conception, p., 8.

³⁹ Stefan Lindberg, "It's our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neopatrimonialism Rather than Counter-Act It?" *Democratization*, Vol.10, No. 2 (2003), 128.

⁴⁰ See Ernest K. Abotsi, "Rethinking the Winner-Takes-All System" *IEA Governance Newsletter*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2013), 1-5.

⁴¹ Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, 2nd Ed. (Michigan: Polity,

2009), 159.

⁴² Ibid., 214.

⁴³ Ibid, 219.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 273.

⁴⁵ Lindberg, "It's our Time to Chop," 140. Also see Susan. Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 201.

⁴⁶ See Joseph Balise "Who is Funding Political Parties in Botswana and for What Benefit?" available at www.sundaystandard.info., (July, 2015), (accessed on 11th July 2016).

⁴⁷ See Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research Report on the State of the Ghanaian Economy, available at <http://www.isser.edu.gh/index.php/sger/50-the-state-of-the-ghanaian-economy-report-2014>. (accessed on 11th July 2015).

⁴⁸ See "White Paper on the Report of the Constitutional Review Commission Presented to the President, p.30

⁴⁹ Gyampo. "Public Funding of Political Parties in Ghana: An Outmoded Conception?" 3.

⁵⁰ Dr. Obed Asamoah, who was a member of the Caucus of Political Party Chairmen (one of the structures under the IEA-GPPP comprising the national chairmen of the four main political parties with representation in parliament), made this point during a Caucus meeting on November 16, 2005 at the Conference Hall of the IEA, Accra, Ghana.

⁵¹ Views expressed by Dan Botwe, former General Secretary of the New Patriotic Party at a Roundtable on Party Financing in Accra on March 15, 2009; Asiedu Nketiah, interview with the author, March 27, 2014, at the Conference Hall of

the Institute of Economic Affairs in Accra, Ghana. During the interview the General Secretary admitted that nothing had been done directly by himself or his party in pushing for a discussion and passage of the draft bill.

⁵² Joseph. R.A Ayee, "Policy Management in Ghana: The Case of the Value-Added Tax (VAT)"

African Journal of Public Administration and Management (AJPAM), Vol. VIII-IX, No. 2 July 1997, pp. 51-64.

⁵³ I am grateful to Prof Atsu Ayee, Adjunct Senior Fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs for this view.